Intentional Criminogenic Conditions
In “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility,” Victor Tadros claims that poor people have legitimate reasons to not be held responsible by the state for the crimes they commit. His main argument is that the state is complicit in the crimes committed by poor people by creating the conditions for them to commit the crimes through economic injustice. Because the state shares responsibility for the crime, it is not able to justly hold someone responsible for the crime without also holding itself responsible for and ending economic injustice. Trying to support the idea that poor people are treated unjustly within the criminal justice system, Tadros thinks that the argument on complicity is the strongest for showing that the state is not entitled to treat poor people this way. I agree that this argument is very powerful and defendable especially in how it uses the states own views of complicity and holding people responsible in situations where it is not directly blameworthy and applies it to situations where the state itself is complicit. I think, however, that the argument could be strengthened by not merely considering how the state knowingly perpetuates the criminogenic conditions of economic injustice but considering how the state is founded on and supported by perpetuating these injustices. In this post, I first discuss the ways in which Tadros thinks the state is complicit in the wrongdoings of poor people. Then, I argue against Tadros’ claim that the state does not intend that the poor will commit crimes by discussing the function of the conviction of poor people for the state’s benefit at the deficit of the poor. I conclude that the state is actually more complicit in the crimes than Tadros gives it credit for and consider how this may alter his conclusion.
For Tadros the state is complicit because the state perpetuates economic injustice with criminogenic conditions. He does not think that the state intentionally wants to make it so poor people commit crimes but that the state at least knows that the conditions would make it so a poor person is more likely to commit crimes. He writes off believing that the state is intentionally complicit as a conspiracy theory (405). Though it is easier to argue that the state is complicit intentionally rather than knowingly or ignorantly, Tadros makes a case for why, intentional or not, creating the conditions for someone to commit a crime makes one responsible for that crime (405). Meaning, for his argument, it is not required that the state intends to disenfranchise poor people through the criminal justice system.
I think, however, that the state does, at least in many circumstances, intend on poor people, typically black people, committing crimes more than others. In the US, these conditions allow the state to suppress the representation of poor people through voting, and also keep poor people and following generations from being able to escape their poverty after being marked by the criminal justice system. This has benefits for the capitalist and white supremacist goals of the United States and it is easy to argue that the disenfranchisement of black people through slavery and incarceration has helped support the US and its elites to maintain power. In the case of the State of Louisiana vs Fair Wayne Bryant, C.J Johnson argues that Bryant’s punishment of life in prison for unsuccessfully stealing someone’s hedge clippers is excessive and dates back to times when the US explicitly created these laws to force poor people into doing labor after the 13th amendment. Johnson writes:
“ In the years following Reconstruction, southern states criminalized recently emancipated African American citizens by introducing extreme sentences for petty theft associated with poverty. These measures enabled southern states to continue using forced-labor (as punishment for a crime) by African Americans even after the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment” (2)
By looking at the racist history of the criminal justice system in the US, the state’s creation of criminogenic conditions can reasonably be argued as intentional and cannot merely be written off as a conspiracy theory as Tadros suggests.
What does taking a strong stance against intentional racism, perpetuated through economic injustice, do for Tadros’ argument? While he was able to conclude that the state is complicit in the crimes of the poor through economic injustice simply by just knowing that they are creating these conditions, an argument of intention could make his argument stronger since intentionally complicit crimes weigh heavier than knowingly complicit crimes. An argument like this may ask him to step out of a liberal framework and maybe closer to a radical leftist focus. I think looking at how these criminogenic conditions support the state, Tadros might be more able to imagine a world where the state holds itself responsible not just for being complicit in crimes of others, but for the crimes it has committed itself: namely through reparations, wealth distribution, and the abolition of the police and prisons.
Tadros, Victor. “Poverty and Criminal Responsibility.” The Journal of Value Inquiry, vol. 43, no. 3, 2009, pp. 391–413. Crossref, doi:10.1007/s10790–009–9180-x.
Johnson, C.J. Dissenting opinion. State of Louisiana vs. Fair Wayne Bryant, 2020. Supreme Court of Louisiana.
